Social capital has been discussed widely as networks based in trust and reciprocity that can facilitate economic development, democratic governance, and sustainable natural resource management. The concept has not been examined thoroughly as an analytical lens for understanding power relations. Drawing on Bourdieu's theory of practice, I develop a relational and contextual view of social capital in order to explore the everyday political exchanges tied to a long-standing community forestry association in Quintana Roo, Mexico. I present a case study that recounts the emergence and decline of a timber marketing fund to illustrate how elite actors from member communities (ejidos) maintain relative dominance within social networks over time. This process of elite persistence exemplifies the downside of social capital but also suggests why institutional design (rules in use) may be insufficient for encouraging rule enforcement and accountability in community-based conservation and development initiatives.
Introduction
A lot has been written about social capital. Even a brief scan of the literature reveals several general reviews alongside abundant applied studies focused on diverse policy arenas including education, social work, and health among others (Halpern, 2005; Field, 2003; Lin, 2002; Baron et al, 2000; Woolcock, 1998; Portes, 1998) . Following trends in other areas, those working in international conservation and development have emphasized the role social capital might play in enhancing development outcomes at various scales, particularly as they relate to questions of economic growth and democratic governance (e.g., Adger, 2003; Krishna, 2002; Pretty and Ward, 2000; Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000) . At the same time, critiques of social capital are numerous (e.g., Fine, 2001; Harriss 2002) , producing a black and white terrain in which the term is either embraced or rejected.
Amid this polarized spectrum, I chart a middle course that attends to the critiques levied against social capital by situating the term within the broader theoretical framework of one its originators-Pierre Bourdieu. Whereas the majority of work on social capital emphasizes social structural traits-networks that can enhance collective cooperative capacityBourdieu's theory of practice stresses social interactions within broader institutional and cultural "fields." As such, the focus of attention turns to the production and reproduction of power relationships over time. In this light, analysis concentrates on dynamic social processes mediated by specific social structural contexts. Discussions of complex divisions and conflict within agrarian communities appear in the literature (e.g., Agrawal and Gibson, 2001; Brosius et al, 2005) , however, the everyday interactions and negotiations that, in the aggregate, shape power dynamics over time have yet to receive a thorough interrogation.
How do certain elite actors persist in dominating community affairs over the long term?
How does elite persistence impact conservation and development activities?
This article explores the emergence and decline of a timber marketing fund linked to a longstanding community forestry association in Quintana Roo, Mexico in order to uncover the complex power dynamics connected with community-based conservation and development.
The first part summarizes on-going debates about social capital, arguing that the concept is most useful as a means for analyzing everyday power relationships. The second part of the article employs this view of social capital to analyze the everyday politics evident in the case of the timber marketing fund. The case reveals how elite actors from member communities (ejidos) helped to undermine the fund by encouraging and partaking in unregulated lending.
In terms of understanding the everyday politics of agrarian communities in rural Mexico, the case illustrates how community elites persist or maintain positions of relative dominance over time. In terms of explaining outcomes associated with community-based conservation and development initiatives, the timber marketing fund example suggests why institutional design (rules in use) may be insufficient for encouraging rule enforcement and accountability.
Shades of Gray-Social Capital and Power Dynamics
Within the literature on conservation and development, social capital refers to social networks based in trust and reciprocity. However, behind this apparently straightforward definition considerable debate lingers regarding both the term's meaning and utility. On one end of the spectrum are those who view social capital mainly as a means of enhancing collective empowerment. On the other end of the spectrum are those who claim that the concept hides more than it reveals, given a lack of attention to broader political economic factors. In the first instance, the developmentalist approach to social capital tends to uncritically promote the term as a "public good," while in the second case critical responses often reject the concept outright as a manifestation of neoliberal hegemony. In this section, I briefly examine these lines of debate in order to uncover a third way of looking at social capital that returns to Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice. An explicitly Bourdieusian perspective on social capital captures everyday politics situated within broader "fields of play."
Those works that fall within what I have generically called the "developmentalist" camp equate social capital with an accumulation of collective cooperative capacity (Pretty and Ward, 2000; Adger, 2003; Krishna, 2002; Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 2002a; 2002b; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000) . Building on the widely cited work of Putnam (1993; , these authors posit that social capital manifests itself as collectivities like networks and organizations (structural social capital) or as individual attitudes and values such as trust (cognitive social capital). They assume that building up "stocks" of social capital will empower collective action in such a way as to encourage positive outcomes like democratic governance, economic development, or sustainable natural resource management. In this way, analysts can estimate the aggregate sum of social capital not just for individuals and organizations but also for communities, regions, and countries. According to this logic, those communities (or regions or countries) with higher accumulated stocks of social capital are more likely to achieve positive development objectives than those with lower holdings. Krishna's (2002) study of 69 villages in two Indian states (Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh) illustrates this approach, concluding that communities with higher social capital were more successful in achieving three "societal objectives": economic development, ethnic peace, and democratic governance.
In contrast, Bebbington and Perreault's (1999) conceptual framework looks beyond Putnam's presentation to consider access to different forms of capital (financial, human, natural, and social) as well as social capital formation at different geographic scales.
However, their core questions fall on the developmentalist end of the spectrum in that they focus on the extent to which social capital-"in the form of community, federated, and national indigenous peoples' organizations and their institutional networks" (395)-has facilitated rural economic development. In this sense, social capital enhances community access to other forms of capital thus presenting people and groups with greater development options.
The main critique of the developmentalist approach centers on core paradigmatic biases. Fine (2001) argues that social capital is but one manifestation of a wider contemporary pattern of colonization of social theory by neo-classical economics. In this sense, the language, and thus conceptual framing, of economics assumes dominance (capital, stocks, assets, investments, rational choice, social capitalists) in explaining social problems, eclipsing alternative understandings such as those rooted in critical political economy. Analysis of "underdevelopment" from the developmentalist perspective focuses attention on a community's lack of social capital rather than long-standing structural inequalities. As a result, responses emphasize "building endowments" of social capital rather than addressing fundamental inequities (see also Harriss, 2002; Fine, 1999; Harriss and De Renzio, 1997) .
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While critical political economists like Fine (2001) and Harriss (2002) largely reject social capital on conceptual grounds (see also Somers, 2004) , their views converge in significant ways with analyses that bring to the fore issues related to class and gender differentiation (Mayoux, 2001; Rankin, 2001; Molyneux, 2002; Mayer and Rankin, 2002) , the role of the state and global institutions (Radcliffe, 2004) , contextualization (Perreault,2003; Mohan and Mohan, 2002; DeFilippis, 2001; Foley and Edwards, 1999) , and access (Bebbington and Perreault, 1999) . In sum, whether supportive or dismissive in their characterization, these writings signal that the conceptual utility of social capital depends on the extent to which analysts tie its deployment to questions of power relationships. Interestingly, although Bourdieu (1986) provided one of the first conceptualizations of social capital, his contribution has been eclipsed by presentations derived from Putnam's work. It is significant, therefore, that a growing number of authors point to Bourdieu as a way to overcome the theoretical lapses apparent in dominant views of social capital (Fine, 2001; Rankin, 2001; Harriss, 2002; Perreault, 2003; Cleaver, 2005; Svendsen, 2006; Bebbington, forthcoming) . What makes Bourdieu's rendering compelling and how does it aid in understanding key conceptual issues mentioned above such as social differentiation and contextualization? In what follows I respond to this question by showing how Bourdieu's social theoretical concepts generate a grounded view of social capital that reflects power dynamics in specific times and places.
Bourdieu Redux-Social Capital as Everyday Politics
To build on the work of others aimed at refining understandings of social capital, I argue that Pierre Bourdieu's work-including his piece on the forms of capital but also his wider theoretical writings-offers the most complete set of ideas for developing a contextual and relational view of power relationships. In contrast to Putnam, who understands social capital as a means of empowerment, Bourdieu's rendering ties the concept explicitly to power dynamics. In this sense, social capital is not an individual or collective attribute but rather an intangible set of relationships; a sphere of formal and informal exchanges in which differentially empowered actors pursue other forms of capital (cultural and economic). In Bourdieu's view, the interactions associated with social capital tend to reproduce dominant relationships of inequality linked to social differentiation (e.g., class or ethnicity).
However, since Bourdieu's explicit treatments of social capital are brief, it is important to situate his use of the term with respect to his wider work. In this section, I explore how three of Bourdieu's core theoretical concepts-habitus, capital, and field-address the conceptual problems discussed above. Such an understanding considers actors operating (exchanging resources) in formal and informal networks embedded in specific historical, institutional, and cultural contexts. While Bourdieu's work has been summarized and interpreted widely (e.g., Wacquant, forthcoming; Robbins, 2000; Swartz, 1997; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Calhoun et al. 1993) , examining debates on social capital in the context of his wider body of work informs a more grounded definition compared to dominant understandings of the term.
Bourdieu's use of the term habitus is important to his presentation of social capital because it suggests how human action shapes and is shaped by the broader structural and cultural bounds of particular contexts (see Bebbington, forthcoming) . Habitus also engenders everyday routines and informal practices that tend to parallel the strategic, rational choices emphasized in Putnam's writing. Bourdieu sees action resulting largely from deeply inscribed dispositions informing a "practical sense" (le sens pratique). From this perspective, strategies do not derive from rationally calculated or even conscious choices but rather stem from pre-reflective tendencies. Actors respond dispositionally but also improvise or adapt at this pre-reflective level given constantly changing configurations of opportunities and constraints. As a result, habitus structures possible practical strategies but does not fully determine them (Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Swartz, 1997; Wacquant, 2005; . On one level, such a practice-based understanding of human action recenters the actor within analyses of social capital and thus overcomes the structural bias evident in most dominant treatments. In other words, attention to social relationships within networks-as opposed to just characterization of the types of bonds inherent in network structurehighlights the everyday enactment of social capital. On another level, however, habitus connotes individuals' and groups' lived cultural and institutional experiences such that inequities and differences related to class, gender, and ethnicity (among other "structuring structures") shape actors' dispositions.
For Bourdieu, the term capital simultaneously represented both a power relationship and a power resource. In this sense, peoples' lived experiences (habitus) derive from relative endowments of different forms of capital, which, in turn, define their historically evolving "positions" within social settings. Actors exchange and accumulate capital (material and virtual) in the course of everyday social interaction. Bourdieu (1986) described three forms of capital including economic, cultural, and social.
4 Economic capital constitutes material and financial assets while cultural capital encompasses symbolic goods, skills, and titles such as educational credentials (Wacquant, forthcoming) . When juxtaposed with the first two forms, social capital represents a slightly different species given its intangible character. It is best distinguished as a means (set of relationships) by which actors accrue economic and cultural capital as a result of participation in culturally embedded networks. Bourdieu's (1986) discussion of the forms of capital offers two observations that inform analyses of everyday politics. First, given unequal distributions of capital in any given context, social interactions tend to reproduce existing power relationships even as incremental change occurs. Second, the forms of capital are convertible such that educational credentials (cultural capital) might produce increased income (economic capital).
In this sense, Bourdieu considered social capital a means of access to other types of capital.
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A broader understanding of capital to simultaneously encompass power relationships and power resources extends analysis of social process beyond purely economistic approaches, which emphasize rational actors who take calculated risks in order to maximize personal or group benefits vis-à-vis stated objectives. 7 As such, analysis can track the flow of different types and quantities of capital, permitting some measure of outcomes-both positive and negative-linked to social capital.
To capture the structural constraints acting upon networks, Bourdieu linked habitus and capital to the concept of "field." Fields are arenas of struggle in which actors attempt to accrue or control economic and cultural capital. It captures formally institutionalized relationships based on explicit codes or rules as well as non-formalized, customary relationships structured by cultural norms or practices. The dominant or subordinate positions that individual and group actors hold within a field are determined by their relative endowments of economic and cultural capital. As a result, the character and configuration of fields constantly shift as power relationships change. In addition, as structural forms, fields present certain "logics" and thus define the domain of struggle. In other words, even though both dominant and subordinate actors may challenge one another for resource control, they all tacitly accept that the "rules of the game" and that certain forms of contestation are legitimate while others are not (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Swartz 1997 ).
To the extent that the concept of field represents institutional and cultural contexts, it addresses the concern that dominant presentations of social capital detach networks from wider political economies, class structures, and ideologies (Perreault, 2003 Over the course of its twenty year history, the Sociedad Sur has sought to diversify its activities with projects in individual communities focused on wildlife management, ecotourism, and woodworking among others. The organization also has played a lead role in establishing a national-level community forestry organization intended to scale-up the sector's political and economic impact. Despite considerable success in reshaping the region's institutional landscape around community forestry, the Sociedad Sur continues to face perennial organizational and economic development challenges stemming from physical differences among member communities, the structure of timber markets, shifts in national agrarian policy, and internal divisions within communities. The timber marketing fund (fondo de acopio maderero) functioned as a type of holding facility that allowed ejidos to secure higher sale prices and find national and international outlets for marketing lesser-known wood species.
By assuming the role of a central financing agency and holding facility, the fund's administrators sought to increase supply side efficiency, leverage higher prices on behalf of communities, and expand both domestic and international markets for the communities'
wood. In practice, the fund did temporarily increase sales of lesser-known, tropical hard and softwoods but did not succeed in garnering higher sale prices, enhancing supply efficiency, or expanding markets. Under the new marketing arrangements, the fund used the federal seed money to pre-finance timber extraction and processing based on firm orders from wholesalers. It then collected a small fee from member ejidos (approximately US$ 0.01/board foot) for performing this service.
Insert Table 1 about here.
On paper, the fund was legally incorporated as a for-profit, civil association with an administrative staff and an elected assembly of delegates from each member community.
Promotional documents emphasized that the fund was a commercial link between buyers and sellers and that communities maintained full control over production. For federal agencies with programs aimed at supporting ejidos, the timber marketing fund fit well with approaches focused on community enterprise development. One federal ministry provided all of the fund's financial capital, a total of almost $250,000 over five years (Table 2) .
From the outside looking in, the fund appeared to be operating successfully. Insert Table 2 about here.
The view of the fund from the inside was quite different. What appeared to be a successful development project with regional impact was, in practice, an unregulated lending operation.
While the fund was designed to serve as a marketing conduit for communities, a significant portion of its financial capital was doled out to individuals and work groups for uses unrelated to timber harvesting, processing, and marketing. Some of the individuals who received money were not affiliated with either the fund or the Sociedad Sur.
To a large extent, the administrators were able to disperse money in this way because the fund had no formal set of procedures governing its operations. Moreover, the fund lacked clear lines of accountability. The fund's assembly of delegates met once in 1997 when it first started doing business but not thereafter. As a result, the fund's administrators carried out their daily transactions but never reported back to the member communities. Similarly, the fund's full name suggested that it was part of the Sociedad Sur, however, the creation of another assembly of delegates indicated a separate governance structure. Because of these ambiguities, the Sociedad Sur's executive committee and technical staff did not formally intervene in the affairs of the fund until mid 2000 when it became clear that much of the money that had been dispersed was non-recoverable. Ultimately, the absence of clear procedures and lines of accountability allowed community and non-community members to access cash loans that were never repaid. In combination with unsuccessful business transactions in which buyers did not fully settle accounts, unregulated lending left the fund in the red by mid 2000 with few prospects for achieving solvency. By late 2000, as evidence of widespread unregulated lending came to light, the federal ministry that supported the fund decided against providing any further grants.
Go With the Flow-Patterns of Giving and Taking
Of the fund's $265,000 in total capital, the vast majority (92 percent) circulated as unregulated loans to individuals, advances to work groups, and open accounts with timber wholesalers. Significantly, conservative estimates suggested that only 29 percent of circulating funds was recoverable. The administrator's report indicated that the majority of funds (63 percent) could not be recovered, which meant that without further injections of federal money, the operation would not be able to cover its own costs or settle accounts with some of its member communities.
An internal audit performed in mid 2000 showed that the fund had distributed money to a range of actors, producing four types of debt-preexisting, client, ejido, and individual (figures 2, 3). First, the fund's administrator reported $11,500 in previous debt, none of which was recoverable, passed on from the fund's first administrator. Much of this sum likely was tied to individual loans; however, no data exist to link money to specific individuals or groups. Second, another $71,300 represented client debt, where timber wholesalers had not paid off balances for sawn lumber received from the fund. The administrator estimated that 83.5 percent of this amount was non-recoverable. Third, over half of the fund's circulating capital corresponded to ejido debt, which was to help cover production costs associated with timber harvesting and milling. The administrator indicated that 58 percent of the $137,800 in ejido debt was most likely non-recoverable. In effect, numerous disbursals to ejidos were unregulated loans to work group leaders. Finally, $24,100 represented unregulated loans to individuals, both members and non-members of the fund. Of the four types, individual and ejido debt present important patterns for analysis.
Insert In theory, debt associated with ejidos and work groups represented advance payments to cover production costs (figure 3). In practice, most participating ejidos adhered to this approach but groups from one community in particular applied the capital in ways that both bypassed and depleted the fund. Of the seven ejidos that owed a total of $138,000 in mid 2000, fund administrators expected five to repay in full because all or most of their wood was being sold via the timber marketing fund and thus served as collateral. However, estimates calculated that only 54 percent of the total amount was recoverable since work groups in the largest debtor ejido were unlikely to return more than 10 percent of their $78,000 deficit. Figure 4 , which schematically illustrates flows of money and timber within the timber marketing fund, shows the differences between ejidos that worked through the fund and the one that received advances (or loans) but diverted monies. The second type suggests complex interchanges that altered power dynamics within and among communities.
Insert Figure 3 about here.
The first type of community, represented by ejido 1 in Figure 4 , primarily maintained a formal commercial exchange relationship with the fund in line with the financial mechanism's original intent. Representatives of work groups received cash advances to cover timber harvesting, milling, and transportation costs. The fund arranged for sales of both mahogany and lesser-known species. Timber wholesalers placed down payments with the fund to guarantee timber contracts. Once milled, work group leaders delivered sawn lumber to the wholesalers via the fund. The fund completed the set of transactions by paying the work group the balance of net profits after deducting the advance and a small fee.
Among those groups that worked through the fund, some leaders (L1, group 1 in figure 4) received unregulated loans that were never repaid (as discussed above).
The second type of community, represented by ejido 2 in Figure 4 , presents a much more complicated set of interactions based in both formal and informal relationships. First, only one work group had a formal commercial relationship with the fund (group 3). This group sold part of its timber volume via the fund and another part independently to a wholesaler.
Second, work group leaders (L4, L5) and local buyers (B1, B2) received unregulated loans masked as formal transactions (the buyers were nominally considered group leaders although they did not function as such). In some cases, group leaders (L4, L5) used cash advances for non-timber related activities and did not repay them. In other cases, local timber buyers (B1, B2) received high payouts from the fund-one individual received $26,000-and used the financial capital to purchase timber volume (unprocessed roundwood measured in cubic meters) from other community members (see below). Thus, in ejido 2, local buyers accumulated significant stocks of timber from other individuals and groups, while selling sawn wood independently to wholesalers. In each case, informal exchanges were one-way, enhancing the financial power of certain individuals but depleting the fund.
Elite Persistence and the Accretion of Power
The timber marketing fund played a significant role in shifting power dynamics within ejido 2 as well as between ejido 2 and other member ejidos (represented by ejido 1). First, the total flow of financial capital to ejido 2 was almost two and half times greater than the community receiving the next highest amount. Since ejido 2 did not sell its wood through the fund for the most part, other communities resented what appeared to be preferential treatment for groups that least needed marketing support. In comparative terms, ejido 1 carried five percent of total ejido debt compared to ejido 2, which accounted for 57 percent.
Second, the internal movement of money within ejido 2 differed greatly compared to other member ejidos. For those ejidos that sold timber through the fund, work group leaders used the financial capital mainly to finance timber extraction and milling. By contrast, in ejido 2, disbursals from the fund circulated internally within an active local timber market in which many community members sold all or part of their annual timber volumes to others to gain access to cash. As a result, advances from the fund allowed certain individuals, who otherwise would not have had sufficient investment capital, to operate as brokers and accumulate the highest relative volumes (B1). Additionally, unregulated loans to established elites within ejido 2 (B2) reinforced their economic positions relative to others by allowing them to purchase wood from other community members at a significant discount. Further discussion of flows of economic capital in ejido 2 shows how unregulated lending supported elite persistence.
Insert Insert Table 3 about here.
Internal exchange dynamics, where local buyers purchased timber volume from other community members (ejidatarios), in part enabled long-standing elite actors to maintain positions of dominance within the ejido at a time when the emergence of work groups tended to mitigate concentrations of power resources. The informal lending that occurred in relation to the timber marketing fund was one set of micro processes or interactions that produced a certain continuity of historical power relationships in ejido 2. Thus the exchanges linked to social capital represented more than elite capture since they illustrate discernible instances that, in the aggregate, suggest longstanding practices ("durable dispositions" in Bourdieu's definition of "habitus") that are culturally defined even as individuals act upon them in everyday practice (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:120-22) . While ejidatarios intentionally sought loans as a means of "capturing" resources, they also participated in performances-"propensities" or "inclinations" discernable in what people do and say-tied to the social history of a place (Bourdieu, 1977:214, n1; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:124) . In this sense, the gestures, physical postures, talk, and routines associated with lending are one expression of everyday life within agrarian communities-a set of practices that resonates strongly with people's lived histories. These everyday performances produced slow accretions of power over time.
The exchanges between ejido 2 and the timber marketing fund represented a single snapshot of a much longer trajectory of similar power plays.
Spinning Wheels-The Insufficiency of Institutional Design
In addition to illustrating patterns of elite persistence, the timber marketing fund case suggests how everyday politics can undermine formal governance systems underlying community-based natural resource management enterprises. Much of the literature on natural resource governance emphasizes "institutional design," where community members and their supporters develop "rules in use" as a means for mediating access and use of "common pool resources." Comparative analysis concludes that successful common pool resource management institutions incorporate key design principles such as membership criteria, enforceable rules, and enforced compliance, among others (Ostrom, 1990; McKean, 2000; Ostrom et al., 1994) .
In the case of the timber marketing fund, informal exchanges based mainly in familial and compadre relationships, exacerbated power differences within and among communities and undermined collective timber marketing efforts. The absence of clear lines of authority, formal operational rules, and effective oversight within the fund allowed unregulated exchanges to persist over the life of the project even when administrative irregularities became glaringly apparent. In addition to institutional design weaknesses, lack of oversight and accountability stemmed from the wide distribution of money among individuals and groups as well as the Sociedad Sur. Moreover, the federal agency that provided the financial capital had little to gain by holding the funds managers to account since it had already received accolades for the project nationally. Thus, all of the main parties linked to the fund had little or no incentive to provide oversight with respect to its operations.
However, the weakness of institutional design and implementation does not entirely explain the negative outcomes presented in this case study. In addition, the timber marketing fund case exemplifies how informal lending networks weaken formal common pool resource regimes. This institutional "drag" represents a positive feedback loop in which non-existent and/or unenforced formal rules enabled unregulated lending as lending, in turn, depleted the fund's economic capital but also overrode existing rules (however weak) and undermined discussions about rule adaptations. Thus, even as the leaders of the Sociedad Sur created a special task force in 2000 to reform the fund, carrying out formal conversations regarding a strict regulatory framework to govern transactions, unregulated lending continued behind the scenes.
The distinction between overlapping but different "fields of play" offers a way to see the friction created by the collision of incompatible logics of action-the field of lending based in informal networks versus the technocratic management field based in the formal organization of the fund and the Sociedad Sur. Historically, the everyday political and social practices linked to informal networks-such as lending-have consistently eaten away at attempts to institutionalize technocratic management tenets, including community enterprises. While it is true that many of the same actors populated both networks and fields of interaction overlapped, it was also the case that lending practices intruded upon the fund's formal but tenuous tenets. In the aggregate, the combination of unregulated lending and unpaid debts forced the timber marketing fund to cease operations in 2003. As of mid 2007, community forestry enterprises in Quintana Roo, Mexico face the same problems of marketing lesser known timber species as they did in the mid 1990s when the fund was conceived.
Don't Think of an Elephant!
Social capital as the term is most commonly understood-networks based in trust and reciprocity-points to important human organizational factors that shape conservation and development outcomes. However, just as importantly, social capital's application as an explanatory variable (e.g., where greater social capital enhances economic development) has produced a situation where the term has outrun the concept. As Smith and Kulynych (2002) note, social capital, as deployed in popular usage, more accurately connotes "social capacity"
rather than a form of capital. In contrast, Bourdieu's presentation of social capital emphasizes power relationships within institutional and cultural fields. In large measure, confusion over the meaning of social capital resides within the term itself: capital. Lakoff's (2004) discussion of political speech in the U.S. suggests how key words evoke broad cognitive frames and associations underlying understandings and emotional responses. He thus instructs political progressives to frame ideas in terms that reflect their core values rather than language that rejects, but still affirms, conservative values ("Don't think of an elephant!"). Similarly, the term "capital" conjures images of tangible resources that can be accumulated, attributed a specific value, and exchanged. However, social capital is intangible; it is a set of relationships that provide access to economic and other forms of capital. While Bourdieu contributed to the problem by employing numerous economic metaphors in his writing, his collective work explicitly seeks to overcome static perspectives on social life.
The case of the timber marketing fund in Quintana Roo, Mexico represents more than an example of the down side of social capital in the form of unregulated lending and petty corruption. A Bourdieusian perspective on community-based natural resource governance reveals the everyday interactions and negotiations-both formal and informal-that create a dynamic web of power relationships. When used in this manner, social capital offers insights on the micro-politics of conservation and development by providing an actor-centered schematic that is dynamic but also situated within institutional and cultural contexts. As such, Bourdieu's contributions to social theory complement other strands in political ecology and development studies such as those that emphasize Foucauldian discourse analysis (e.g., Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 1990; Peet and Watts, 1996) . Thus, despite lingering skepticism and critique, social capital remains an important concept that warrants continued use and interrogation, especially when specifically tied to power dynamics as opposed to broadband views that cast the term as collective cooperative capacity. Individual and family names are pseudonyms. a harvest volume for mahogany and cedar (high-value species); b The denomination "S.P.R." or "Sociedad de Producción Rural" indicates that the group is formally registered with the National Agrarian Registry (RAN); c indicates an individual timber buyer whose membership and individual volume are counted under the family section; d "Desvalagados" translates as "disengaged" or "unaffiliated." It does not represent a group per se but rather a grouping of individuals not affiliated with other groups. 
